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It is a well established idea that Bertrand competition is more 
efficient in welfare terms than Cournot competition regardless of 
the degree of substitutability or complementarity of the commodi­
ties produced by the firms. In this paper I show that, intro­
ducing incomplete information about rivals’ costs of production 
this conclusion does not always hold: in a homogeneous duopoly, 
the Bertrand price (aggregate output) is higher (lower) than the 
Cournot one if both firms have low costs of production and the 
costs are uniformly distributed.






















































































































































































1 In tro d u ctio n
The Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883) models are cornerstones in the 
modern theory of oligopoly. In the former firms’ strategic variable is the 
quantity of output to produce while in the latter firms choose the price. 
Interestingly, Bertrand competition has always been considered as more 
efficient in welfare terms than Cournot competition because it leads to 
lower prices and larger quantities (see for example Shubik (1980), Singh 
and Vives (1984) and Vives (1985)). Indeed, if we assume that firms 
produce a homogeneous product at a common constant marginal cost, 
Bertrand competition will lead to a price equal to the marginal cost while 
Cournot competition will lead to a price which is intermediate between 
the competitive and the monopolistic price. If, to the contrary, we as­
sume that firms produce differentiated products, then, Bertrand price 
will be above the marginal cost but it will be again lower than the corre­
sponding Cournot price. Therefore, consumer surplus and total surplus 
are always higher in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition. 
Furthermore, profits in Cournot competition are higher, equal or smaller 
than in Bertrand competition if the goods are substitutes, independent 
or complements.1
However, Singh and Vives (1984) state that the conclusion that 
Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition is not 
correct ”if one considers supergame equilibria. Price-setting supergame 
equilibria may support higher prices than quantity-setting equilibria for 
either homogeneous or differentiated products. See Brock and Scheinkman 
(1981) and Deneckere (1983)”. That is, Singh and Vives restrict the 
validity of the conclusion to the class of static games only. Moreover, 
Vives (1984), analysing an incomplete information setting where firms 
receive signals about the uncertain demand, proves that the Bertrand 
Bayesian-Nash price (quantity) is, again, lower (higher) than the Cournot 
Bayesian-Nash one.
In this paper I argue that introducing incomplete information about




























































































rivals’ costs of production leads to completely different results. Indeed, I 
show that in a homogeneous duopoly in which each firm knows the value 
of its own marginal cost and the distribution function of its rival’s one, in 
equilibrium, the Bertrand price (quantity) might be higher (lower) than 
the Cournot price (quantity). This will be the case -rather surprisingly- 
when both firms are relatively efficient, that is, have low costs. The 
intuition for this result is that when both firms have low costs, they will 
both produce a relatively large quantity in the Cournot game so that the 
price will be relatively low. To the contrary, in the Bertrand game, only 
one firm will produce in equilibrium and will sell at a high price-cost 
margin as long as its cost is low. Moreover, ex ante expected profits, 
i.e. before the game is actually played and the true costs revealed, are 
always higher in the Bertrand game regardless the value of each firm’s 
cost. This conclusion is exactly the opposite of the one obtained by Vives 
(1984) in his model with uncertain demand. Indeed, Vives shows that 
firms’ expected profits are always higher in the Cournot game. Finally, 
while the ex post profit of the less efficient firm is generally positive in the 
Cournot game and always zero in the Bertrand game, the ex post profit 
of the most efficient firm is very likely to be higher in the latter.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, I analyse the 
Bertrand and Cournot static games with incomplete information in an 
industry with n firms calculating the equilibrium prices and quantities 
and also firms’ ex ante and ex post profits. In Section 3, I make compar­
isons between these equilibrium values in the special case of a duopoly 
because a higher number of firms would complicate the analysis without 
affecting the results qualitatively.
2 C ou rn ot and B ertran d  m od els  w ith  in ­
co m p le te  in form ation .
In both models I will use the following assumptions.




























































































A2) The demand function is a linear function of the price: i.e. Q = 1 — p
n
where Q <7i is the aggregate quantity and p is the price;
i=l
A3) The cost function for firm i is C,((/,) = c,q,\ i.e. there are no fixed 
costs and the marginal cost is constant;
A4) The marginal cost c, is independently and uniformly distributed on
[o,i];
A5) Each firm knows the value of its own cost, but only knows the dis­
tribution function of its rivals’ unit costs;
A6) Firms meet only once in the market and they choose the value of 
their strategic variable (i.e. the price in the Bertrand game and the 
quantity in the Cournot game) simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
Given the above assumptions both the Bertrand and the Cournot 
games are static games of incomplete information. Therefore, the relevant 
concept of equilibrium will be the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. In the next 
two subsections I compute the equilibria for each of the two games under 
analysis.
2.1 T h e  B ertrand  gam e.
The Bertrand Bayesian-Nash equilibrium when rivals’ costs are unknown 
has been recently characterised by Spulber (1995). Using more general 
assumptions than those described above (i.e. the demand function is 
not necessarily linear and the costs are not necessarily drawn from a 
uniform distribution) he proves that the static Bertrand game of incom­
plete information has a unique symmetric equilibrium pricing strategy 
p*(c) which is increasing, differentiable and solves a system given by a 
differential equation and two boundary conditions. However, because of 
the generality of the assumptions made he does not actually solve for 
the equilibrium. Using the more specific assumptions A1-A6 and much 





























































































Recall that in a static Bayesian game, a strategy for player i is a 
function from types to actions. Hence, in our game, a strategy for firm 
i is a function p, (ct) which specifies a price p; for each possible value of 
the marginal cost c,-. Suppose, then, that all i’s rivals adopt the same 
strategy p (cj) with j  = 1,..., n and i ^  j.




p_i is the smallest price in the set of the equilibrium prices chosen 
by all i’s rivals using function p (.);
m G [2, n\ is the number of firms that charge p_,.
In order to choose its optimal price, firm i will solve the following max­
imisation problem given the value of its cost of production c,-:
if Pi < p-i 
if Pi =  p-i 
if Pi > p-i
max (l-Pi){Pi-Ci)Pv(pi<p_i)+— P r(F i= ? -i)+ O P r (p i>p_i).
(1)
Now, since the marginal costs are distributed along a continuous interval, 
we have
P r (c{ =  Cj) =  0 Vi, j.
Supposing that the strategy p(.) adopted by all i’s rivals is a strictly 
monotone and differentiable function of the marginal cost, then also the 
prices will be uniformly and independently distributed. So
Pr (jpi =  Pj) — 0 Vi, j.




























































































max (1 - pi){pi -  Ci)Pi(pi < p -i) . (2)
Pt
Now, since all firms different from i adopt the same strategy p(.) and 
since the costs are drawn independently, we have:
P r (Pi <P-i) =  P r (j>i <p(c1))Pr(pi < p(c2) ) .... Pr (p,- < p(c„)). (3)
Let us denote with p~l (p j) the marginal cost that firm j  must have in 
order to select price p j. Clearly, our interest is limited to the values of 
Pj for which
0 < P~l (Pj) < 1. (4)
Since the marginal cost Cj is uniformly distributed on [0,1],
Pr (pi < p(cj)) = Pr (p_1 (p^ < Cj) = 1 -  p -1 (Pi) (5)
and (3) can be rewritten:
Pr (pi < p .j)  =  (l -  p_1 (p;))" 1 •
The maximisation problem (2) becomes
max (1 -  p^  (pi -  a) (1 -  p~x (p,))"-1
P*
s.t. 0 < p-1 (pi) < 1.
The reader can easily verify that the unique corner solution is given by 
Pi =  p* where p* is the price chosen by any rival that uses the strategy p(.) 
when its cost of production is zero. However, this would be an equilibrium 
only in the particular event in which all the firms have a unit cost equal 
to zero. Since I assumed that the costs are uniformly and independently 
distributed, the probability of this event is zero. Therefore, when looking 































































































The first order necessary condition for an interior optimum is that
i d i
( - 2 p i + C i + l )  (l-p -1 (pi))" 1 +  (-p 2i + P i C i + P i - C i ) —  (l-p _1 ( p i ) Y  1 =0.
P '  ( 8)
The first order condition defines an implicit function of player Vs best re­
sponse to the strategy p(.) played by all the rival firms, given that player 
Vs marginal cost is c,-. If the strategy p(.) is to be a symmetric Bayesian- 
Nash equilibrium, we require that the solution to the first order condition 
be p(ci): that is, for each firm i’s possible marginal costs, firm i does not 
wish to deviate from the strategy p(.) given that i’s rivals play this strat­
egy. To impose this requirement, we substitute p,- — p(c,) into the first or­
der condition, obtaining (also taking into account that p_1 [p(c,)J = c,):
p (c.) (1 -  Ci) (1 + Ci -  2p (c,)) -  (n -  1) (p (ci) -  et) (1 -  p(c,)) =  0. (9)
Equation (9) can be rewritten in the following way:
, ,  x (n  -  l ) ( p ( c , )  -  d )  (1 -  p(cj))
P[Ci> (1 — Ci) (1 +  Ci — 2p (cj))
(10)
The following lemma is very useful to determine the unique Bayesian- 
Nash equilibrium of our game.
Lemma 1. The unique strictly monotone function which solves the dif­
ferential equation in (10) is
Pi{ci) :=
1 n
1 +  n 1 + n C'"
Proof. See Appendix 1.
( H )




























































































Proposition 1. The strategy defined by equation (11) is the unique 
symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game defined by assumptions 
A1-A6.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Since all firms adopt the same strictly increasing function of the cost of 
production, the firm that can produce at the minimum cost will charge 
the smallest price. Moreover, since Pr(c; = Cj) — 0, there will be only 
one firm charging the minimum price. Therefore, this firm will satisfy the 
whole market demand. Now, supposing, without loss of generality that 




1 +  n 1 + n 1
and the equilibrium quantity will be
( 12)
QB =  g? =  l -  PB =  (13)1 4-72
Note that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms 
have a positive ex ante expected profit before the game is actually played. 
Indeed,
nf =  (1 -  Pi) (Pi -  Ci) Pr (Pi < p -i)  =  n ^ — ■ 2 (14)
(! +  «)
which is equal to zero only in the extreme case where c,- =  1 and strictly 
positive elsewhere.
Note also that the price charged by each firm is always greater than 
the unit cost of production and, hence, the firm that ends up operating 
always obtains positive profits. More precisely, the profit of the firm that 





























































































which is equal to zero only in the extreme case where C\ = 1, which 
occurs with probability zero, and strictly positive elsewhere. Clearly, all 
the other firms, i.e. the less efficient ones, will obtain, ex post, a profit 
equal to zero.
Finally, note that the price, the ex ante expected profit of every firm and 
the ex post profit of the winner are decreasing functions of the number of 
firms in the industry and if this number tends to infinity, then each firm 
tends to choose a price equal to its unit cost and the ex ante and ex post 
profits all converge to zero.
2.2 T h e C ournot gam e.
The Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium when rivals’ costs are unknown 
is more straightforward to derive than the corresponding Bertrand Bayesian- 
Nash equilibrium analysed in the previous subsection. In particular, 
Cramton and Palfrey (1990) calculate this equilibrium by making as­
sumptions A1-A6. In what follows I give the results that they obtain. 
The interested reader will find the detailed proof in the original paper.
In this game, each firm maximises its expected profit given the output 
decisions of the other firms.
Firm Vs expected profit is
where c — 1 — (n — l)q and q is the expected value of qt.
Cramton and Palfrey show that, given assumptions A1-A6, there 
exists a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which the quantity of out­
put produced by firm i with cost c, is
(16)
if Ci >  c  




























































































where c = 1 -  (n -  l)q = .
Therefore, the resulting Cournot equilibrium price is
i=l
and the Cournot equilibrium aggregate output is
Qc = £
» = i
Firm Vs ex ante expected profit is
n f
0 if Ci >  c
( '-« y
4 if Ci <  c
Firm i's ex post profit is
IC =
if Ci >  C





3 C om p arison  o f  th e  tw o m od els .
We now have all the necessary material to compare the two models. For 
the sake of simplicity in this section I assume that in the industry there 
are only two firms, that is n = 2.2
In what follows I show that Bertrand competition can lead to a 
higher (lower) price (quantity) than Cournot competition. Moreover, in 
the Bertrand game, firm i's ex ante expected profit is always higher and 
also the ex post profit of the more efficient firm is very likely to be higher 
than in the Cournot game.
2For simplicity, I make the assumption that n = 2. If n > 2, the qualitative results 




























































































3.1 E quilibrium  P rices and Q u an tities.
The market price resulting from the Bertrand game can be higher than 
the one resulting from the Cournot game. Correspondingly, the aggregate 
Bertrand quantity, consumer surplus and total surplus, will be lower than 
the corresponding Cournot values. This means that Cournot competition 
can lead to more efficient outcomes than Bertrand competition.
Let the costs of the two firms be ct and c2 and suppose, without 
loss of generality, that cj < c2. From (12) we know that if the two firms 
engage in the Bertrand game, the resulting market price is
PB
\+ 2 c x
~ 3 ( 22)
To the contrary, (17) and (18) lead to the following market price in the 
Cournot game:
Pc = l - Q c
3 - 2 a/2  +  ^  
2 -  \/2 + f  
1
if Cl < c2 < 2 (v ^  -  l)
if cj < 2 (>/2 -  l)  < c2 , (23)
if 2 (>/2 -  l )  < cj < c2
where Qc = qf + <f{ is the aggregate Cournot output.
The reader can easily verify that pB > pc whenever the costs of the 
two firms satisfy the following condition:
^  c1 + 4(3n/ 2 - 4 )  
Cl < c2 < -------------------
which implies that Ci < 2 (3\/2 — 4̂  ~  0.485.
(24)
Recalling that the costs of production are uniformly and indepen­
dently distributed on [0,1], we can conclude that the condition in (24) 
will be satisfied with a probability equal to 15.7% (see Figure 1 where




























































































Hence, if the two firms are relatively efficient, the Bertrand game 
will lead to a higher price than the Cournot game. The intuition of this 
result is as follows. In the Cournot game, firms use (17) and, therefore, if 
both have low costs, they will both produce a relatively large quantity of 
output leading to a relatively low market price. To the contrary, in the 
Bertrand game, due to the assumptions that goods are perfect substitutes 
and firms have no capacity constraints, only the firm with the lowest 
cost of production will produce in equilibrium and will satisfy the whole 
market demand given that the chosen price is the one in (22). Now, 
even though the price is strictly increasing in the cost of production, the 
price-cost margin is strictly decreasing with respect to the same variable. 
That is, like in the monopoly case, the market price is relatively higher 
when the cost of production is relatively low.
Note also that since price and aggregate quantity axe inversely related 
(i.e. p = 1 — Q), whenever the Bertrand price is higher than the Cournot 
price, the Bertrand aggregate output will be smaller. This means that 
with a probability of 15.7% the static Cournot game with incomplete 
information will lead to an outcome which is more efficient in welfare 
terms than the corresponding Bertrand game.
3.2 Ex ante ex p ec ted  profits.
We will now see that the ex ante expected profit for both firms is higher 
in the Bertrand game than in the Cournot game.
From (14), firm i’s ex ante Bertrand profit when n = 2 is
j r B  2 (1 —  C j f
'' 9
To the contrary, from (20) firm i s ex ante Cournot profit when n
0 if Ci > 2 (y/2 -  l)






























































































The reader can easily check that I lf  > Ilf  when c, £ [0,1]. That is, the 
ex ante expected profit from engaging in price competition against the 
rival is higher than the one from engaging in quantity competition and 
this is true whatever the values of the two costs of production are.
As I mentioned in the Introduction, this result contradicts Propo­
sition 9 in Vives (1984) where the opposite statement is derived in a 
duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain 
linear demand.
3.3 Ex post profits.
In the Bertrand game, the ex post profit of the less efficient firm (i.e. firm 
2) is always zero. To the contrary, in the Cournot game, this will be zero 
if c2 > 2 (\/2 — l) and positive otherwise. Things are different for the 
more efficient firm. Indeed, we will now see that the ex post profit of firm 
1 is very likely to be higher in the Bertrand game than in the Cournot 
one.
From (15), the ex post Bertrand profit of the winner when n — 2 is
ttB 2 (1 —Cl)2
111 "  9
To the contrary, from (21) and (23), the ex post Cournot profit of the 
firm with the minimum cost when n = 2 is
(27)
n?
(3 -  2v^ + Slf L) '
(2 _ n/2 _
if Cl < c2 < 2 (v^  -  l) 
if d  < 2 (x/2 -  l)  < c2 
if 2 (>/2 -  l)  < cx < c2
(28)
The reader can verify that Ilf  > I lf  whenever the costs of the two firms 





























































































Ci G [c1;c] if Ci < d
c2 G [ci, 1] if Ci > d (29)
d = 2 (3^2 -  4) ,
- c j  +  ( 2 0 -  18v /2 )c i + 2 6 0 - 1 8 0 ^ 2  
C _  9 ( 2 v / 2 - 2 - c , )  ’
Again, since the costs of production are uniformly and independently 
distributed on [0,1], we can conclude that the condition in (29) will be 
satisfied with a probability equal to 77.942% (see Figure 2 for a graphical 
representation). That is, as I have already mentioned, the Bertrand 
game will lead with a very high probability to a higher profit for the 
more efficient firm than the Cournot game. This means that profits in 
Bertrand competition can be higher than in Cournot competition even 
when goods are substitutes and not only when they are complements as 
stated by Singh and Vives (1984) in the complete information framework.
A  1
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the differential equation in (10), which is 
relabelled as (Al):
, / > (1 - » )  (<=i ~  P (c,)) (1 ~p(Cj))
PK,> {ci — 1) (2p (cj) — Ci — 1) (Al)
The function p'{ci) is everywhere continuous except for all points (c;,p,) 
where either c,- =  1 or p,- =  (c, + l)/2. Representing these lines on a graph 
(see Figure Al) and recalling that C; G [0,1], we can infer that there exist 
two different regions to the left of c,- = 1 where p'(c,-) is continuous: the 
one below the line p(c.) = (c; +  l)/2  and the one above that same line. In 
these two regions, the conditions required by the Cauchy-Peano theorem 
for the existence and uniqueness of a solution of a differential equation 




























































































This means that in each of the above mentioned regions there exists a 
unique solution.
Let us see now whether these solutions can be linear.
By substituting in (Al) the generic function p(ci) with the function




The values of a and b that solve equation A2) are
M) = (i,o)
and
(“■ M r b i r ; ) -
Therefore, in the region above the line p(c;) =  (c; + l)/2, the unique 
solution is given by the line p,- =  1. However, this solution is irrelevant 
for the solution of our problem since I assumed that the strategy p(.) 
adopted by i's rivals has to be a strictly monotone function of the unit 
cost of production. To the contrary, in the region below the line p(c,) = 






























































































Proof of Proposition 1. From (6) and (11) we obtain
Pr (Pi <P-i) =
(n + l ) ( l  -  pi) with —-— < pi < 1. (A3)
1 +  n v 'n
Therefore, if all firms except firm i adopt strategy (11), then problem (2) 
can be rewritten in the following way:
whose unique solution is (11).
Therefore, strategy (11) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of our game. 
Moreover, since Lemma 1 states that there do not exist other strategies 
that satisfy the first order conditions, strategy (11) is also the unique 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game.
Q.E.D.
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